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A PATCHWORK THEORY OF BLACKMAIL
ScoTr ALTMANt
Blackmail poses many puzzles. Several legal divergences need
justification. Demanding payment not to disclose embarrassing
information is usually a crime, 1 yet it is lawful to disclose such
information and to demand payments for other forbearances.
Parallel puzzles concern a moral divergence. Demanding payment
not to disclose embarrassing information is a serious prima facie
moral wrong, yet disclosing the information is often acceptable or
only moderately immoral.2 Further, some people want justifica-
tions that account for the widely held intuition that blackmail
wrongs its victim, not just society or particular third parties.
Justifying the moral and legal divergences implicates other
controversies. We do not agree on what constitutes immorality, or
about what justifies criminal sanctions. Thoroughgoing utilitarians
write about whether permitting blackmail would reduce misalloca-
tion of resources. From their perspective, answering this question
might resolve the legal and moral puzzles. But from many perspec-
tives this question seems marginal. Inefficiency is grounds neither
for condemnation nor for punishment. Nonetheless, everyone can
benefit from dialogue. That people who disagree about many legal
and moral questions usually favor punishing blackmailers suggests
room for overlapping consensus on this issue.
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1 For a review of the variations in blackmail laws, see James Lindgren, Unraveling
the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 670, 673-76 (1984). Among those
primarily concerned with blackmail's legal status, some are interested in whether
certain demands for payment in exchange for silence should be crimes, such as
market-price blackmail, see Jeffrie G. Murphy, Blackmail: A Preliminay Inquiy, 63
MONIST 156, 163-65 (1980), blackmail of criminals, seeJennifer G. Brown, Blackmail
as PrivateJustice, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1935, 1943-49 (1993), or claim-of-right blackmail,
see Lindgren, supra, at 677-80. Interest in these defenses seems partly driven by the
belief that attitudes toward these defenses might provide hints about blackmail
generally.
2 The question is sometimes stated more broadly: Why is it ever wrong to place
a condition on doing a permissible but optional act? See Scott Altman, Divorcing
Threats and Offers (Sept. 1992) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). I limit
this paper to the narrower category because some reasons for condemning and
prohibiting blackmail are specific to problems of secrecy and information.
(1639)
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We might more easily solve the legal and moral puzzles if we
stop insisting that one principle must explain every aspect of
blackmail. I recommend abandoning the search for a unified
explanation. Probably no single flaw justifies condemning and
prohibiting all and only blackmail transactions. Often multiple
overlapping justifications support legal and moral obligations.
Because blackmail is varied, different reasons might support
condemning and prohibiting different forms.3 The legal ban (like
most rules) is probably both overinclusive and underinclusive
compared to the moral arguments supporting it.
4
In this article, I present a patchwork of theories to justify
condemning and prohibiting blackmail. Part I argues that most
blackmailers commit two serious moral wrongs-coercion and
exploitation-that justify condemnation and prohibition. Part II
considers the sufficiency and necessity of explanations based on
coercion and exploitation. I reach two conclusions. First, even
though some blackmailers do not coerce or exploit, we rightly
prohibit blackmail because the remaining blackmailers either
commit some other serious wrong or are too rare and difficult to
identify for practical exceptions. Second, a patchwork of theories
best justifies our treatment of blackmail if it includes accounts of
coercion and exploitation. Finally, Part III explains why we should
not prohibit forms of hard bargaining that seem similar to black-
mail. Many do not actually involve coercion and exploitation.
Others can be deterred only with unacceptable costs not present in
the case of blackmail.
I. BLACKMAIL AS COERCION AND EXPLOITATION
Two aspects of blackmail strike me as central to its immorality.
First, many blackmailers would not have revealed the victim's secret
had they lacked an opportunity to demand payment. Most
blackmail differs in this regard from typical business transactions.
Blackmailers sell secrecy, a product many of them would give away
if unable to bargain. Grocers would not give away food if they
could not demand payment. Both grocer and customer benefit
3 The circumstances of blackmail vary in several ways, including the nature of
the information, see Joel Feinberg, The Paradox of Blackmail, I RATIO JuRis 83
(1988), and the means and purpose of acquiring the information, see MIKE
HEPWORTH, BLACKMAIL 29-40 (1975).
4 See FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES 32 (1991).
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from the opportunity to bargain. On the other hand, the possibility
of blackmail transactions primarily benefits blackmailers.
5
Second, blackmailers profit from vulnerability. Blackmail
succeeds when the victim believes exposure will create serious
hardships: loss of dignity, reputation, safety, freedom, career,
personal relationships, and other similarly central aspects of the
individual's life. Blackmailers receive significant premiums over
other potential uses for their information because blackmail victims
want to avoid these harms.
In the remainder of this section, I explain why demanding
payment for things one would otherwise have given away and
profiting from vulnerability are sometimes serious moral wrongs to
a victim.
A. Coercion
Without the opportunity to negotiate, many blackmailers would
not reveal the information. Although some blackmailers could sell
their information elsewhere, they could rarely do so as profitably.
As a result, information acquired for the purpose of blackmail often
would not have been acquired.6 Professional blackmailers might
turn to kidnapping rather than journalism. Additionally, informa-
tion acquired accidentally often would not have been disclosed.7
I will argue that most blackmail proposals are therefore threats,
which commit the prima facie moral wrong of coercion. I first
explain what I mean by a threat, and then why I think coercion is a
prima facie wrong.
5 This point has been widely noted. See e.g., George Daly & J. Fred Giertz,
Externalities, Extortion, and Efficiency: Reply, 68 AM. ECON. REV. 736, 736 n.2 (1978)
(noting that while blackmailers do not directly benefit from revealing information,
they nevertheless obtain compensation from the victim).
This includes commercial research blackmail, in which information is
intentionally acquired for the purpose of blackmail, and entrepreneurial blackmail,
in which victims are enticed into compromising positions so that they can be
blackmailed. See HEPWORTH, supra note 3, at 74-76.
This includes opportunistic blackmail in which information is discovered by
accident, and participant blackmail, in which the information arises from some
relationship between blackmailer and victim. See id. at 75-77. Although disclosure
is often relatively easy, it is rarely costless. One must first locate an appropriate
listener. The information will sometimes be unwelcome, making disclosure itself
unpleasant. With some information one risks the social stigma of being labeled a
gossip.
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Threats deprive the recipient of an important option available
in some alternative situation. Writers disagree on how to describe
the alternative situation. Possibilities include:
1. What is the statistically likely outcome for a person in this
position?8 (statistical baseline)
2. What outcome is the recipient morally or legally entitled to?9
(moral baseline)
3. What outcome did the recipient expect?'0 (phenomenolog-
ical baseline)
Tests using these baselines do not detect all wrongful proposals. I
have argued elsewhere that the moral baseline must be supplement-
ed with a nonmoral baseline11 and that the statistical and pheno-
menological baselines fail to identify coercion. 12  I suggest a
baseline that inquires into a specific counterfactual question: If the
proposer could not have imposed the condition, would the proposer
have given the benefit or withheld the harm anyway?13  If the
answer is yes, and if the option was important to the recipient, then
the proposer removes otherwise available important options.
14
The removal of important available options to alter someone's
actions is coercion.
Other baselines neglect available-option removal. What usually
happens, what the recipient thought would happen, or what should
happen does not indicate whether a proposal actually removed an
available option. Whether an option was available depends on what
would have happened in this case without the proposal.
8 Nozick refers to the "normal or usual course of events." Robert Nozick,
Coercion, in PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND SOCIETY 101, 116 (Peter Laslett et al. eds.,
1972).
9 See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT As PROMIsE 97-99 (1981) (defining
whether an act is coercive "in terms of the rights of the parties"); Cheyney C.
Ryan, The Normative Concept of Coercion, 89 MIND 481, 483-91 (1980) (exploring
how a consideration of rights informs the definition of coercion).
10 See ALAN WERTHEIMER, COERCION 207 (1987).
11 Many blackmailers coerce even on a moral baseline because they propose to
reveal information they are obligated not to reveal.
12 See Altman, supra note 2, at 3.
13 See id. This baseline is close to the category Nozick identifies as unproduc-
tive exchanges. See ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 85 (1974). My
account differs from his in several respects. First, I believe these proposals are
threats, morally wrongful for limiting freedom. Nozick adopts an account of
threats that relies on a combined statistical and moral baseline. See Nozick, supra
note 8, at 116. Second, I explain why these proposals are immoral. Third, I
identify exploitation as a central moral flaw in most of these exchanges.
14 See Altman, supra note 2, at 4.
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Consider, for example, a drowning victim. The only available
potential rescuer proposes to save the victim for a promise of cash.
Whether this proposal has removed the option of being saved for
free depends on what this potential rescuer would have done if
demanding payment were impossible. If this person would have
attempted the rescue, then the proposal removed the otherwise
available option of being saved without promising cash. If this
person would have left the victim, then the opportunity to negotiate
made available the chance to be saved.15
Removing otherwise available important options can be
condemned as prima facie wrong based on a variety of moral views.
I have elsewhere argued that it violates norms of respecting
autonomy and not treating others as only means.16 A contractar-
ian argument supports the same conclusion. Any person should
accept and would benefit from a presumption against such propos-
als. If each of us took every opportunity we have to threaten others
everyone would be worse off, including even those who sometimes
benefit by making threats. At every moment someone would be
demanding payment not to make noise or to do some act for which
we all depend on others each day. To avoid the constant stream of
threats, everyone would invest in wasteful precautionary devices to
insulate themselves from vulnerability. The time and expense of
many otherwise unnecessary negotiations would also make everyone
poorer.
A presumption against such threats has few costs. A norm
against asking to be paid for what one is willing to do for free does
not prevent beneficial bargains because it never disallows anyone
from receiving a minimum asking price. Because a general rule
against threats benefits everyone at little social cost, it should be
regarded as a prima facie moral rule no less than rules against theft
and physical violence.
15 Sometimes the ability to negotiate affects other facets of the negotiation.
Without the chance to negotiate, the proposer might not be present at all. See
e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Salvors, Finders, Good Samaritans, and
Other Rescuers: An Economic Study of Law and Altruism, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 83, 99
(1978) (stating that the quantity of "rescue inputs" will rise as compensation is
introduced). In these cases, whether a proposal has increased freedom depends
on whether the ability to negotiate in similar cases increased the options available
to this person.
16 See Altman, supra note 2, at 4, 15-16.
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B. Exploitation
Blackmail victims are particularly vulnerable. They can be
driven to irrational17 or criminal behavior.'8 Although this vul-
nerability has been widely noted, it has not satisfactorily solved
puzzles about blackmail. Irrational bargains are not usually crimes,
and the potential to create subsidiary crime does not explain why
blackmail wrongs its victims. I will argue that blackmailers profit
from their victims' vulnerability in specific ways that constitute
prima facie wrongful exploitation.
To avoid controversial positions I define exploitation narrowly
as "benefitting at another person's expense from her difficul-
ties." 19  By "benefitting at another person's expense," I mean
obtaining a better deal in negotiation than one would have obtained
for the same good or service had that person lacked the difficul-
ty.2 0 By "difficulty" I mean more than just strong desire for some
service or product. I mean something closer to loss of, or choice
between, primary goods.21 For example, charging higher than face
value for scarce tickets to a sporting event does not exploit the
buyer because there is no reason to think the buyer's desire to
attend stems from any hardship. On the other hand, charging
poison victims who face imminent death more for medication than
17 David Owens suggests blackmail victims are irrational because blackmailers
cannot deliver secrecy. See David Owens, Should Blackmail be Banned?, 63 PHIL.
501, 507 (1988). Owens overstates blackmail victims' inability to estimate the
likelihood of alternate sources of disclosure. See Hugh Evans, Why Blackmail
Should be Banned, 65 PHIL. 89, 90 (1990). Owens, however, understates the real
irrationality of victims-believing that blackmailers will not later demand more
payment. See HEPWORTH, supra note 3, at 42 (stating that recurring demands for
money are a frequent feature in recorded cases).
18 See Richard A. Epstein, Blackmai Inc., 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 553, 564 (1983).
19 A broader definition would include benefits not obtained at the expense of a
victim, and would expand the characteristics that one should not benefit from to
include admirable qualities. See Joel Feinberg, Noncoercive Exploitation, in
PATERNALISM 201, 203 (Rolf Sartorius ed., 1983) (defining exploitation to include
making a profit or gain from another's strength or virtue as well as weakness or
flaw).
20 See Deirdre Golash, Exploitation and Coercion, 15 J. VALUE INQUIRY 319, 324
(1981); Anthony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J.
472, 478 (1980).
21 See JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE 62 (1971) (listing primary goods to
include rights, liberty, power, opportunities, income, wealth, self-respect, health,
vigor, intelligence, and imagination).
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one would charge less desperate purchasers of the same drug
exploits their hardship.
22
Blackmailers typically exploit their victims' vulnerability in
several ways. First, they demand more for silence than the price for
which they could have sold the information. This differs from most
decisions to sell a product to the highest bidder because the power
to price silence higher than disclosure (even if the market for the
information is competitive) derives from the victim's desire to avoid
serious hardship. Second, blackmailers frequently demand repeated
payments for their silence.2 Victims often regard prior payments
as sunk costs and do not complain about the blackmailer's breached
promise to keep silent for fear of disclosure. In both respects
blackmailers benefit-increase their profits-from their victims'
hardship.
Exploitation is prima facie wrong because it contributes to
various forms of injustice. Blackmailers' exploitation usually
contributes to injustice by compounding hardship. This is some-
times called "justice according to Saint Matthew." 24 Poor people
spend more for food than rich people. Homeless persons who have
nowhere to sleep are arrested in public places for loitering or illegal
camping. Exploiters who benefit at the expense of people in hard
circumstances take part in this form of injustice.
II. PATCHING THEORIES TOGETHER
Recognizing that many blackmailers both coerce and exploit
accounts for several difficulties. Coercion and exploitation wrong
a victim. These wrongs deserve significant blame, especially when
they occur together. Acts that both coerce and exploit are rarely
justifiable because the main justifications for coercion-paternalism
and preventing the wrongful act of another-are rarely present when
the purpose of coercing is to create exploitable hardship. Exploita-
tion is thus both a wrong itself and a fact that precludes justification
for coercion.
25
22 See Altman, supra note 2, at 10.
23 See HEPWORTH, supra note 3, at 42.
24 See JON ELSTER, SOLOMONIC JUDGMENTS: STUDIES IN THE LIMITATIONS OF
RATIONALITY 140 (1989); see also Matthew 25:29 (New English) ("For the man who
has will always be given more, till he has enough and to spare; and the man who
has not will forfeit even what he has.").
2 See Altman, supra note 2, at 18-19. David Zimmerman discusses a person
who kidnaps a victim to an island for the purpose of employing the victim at a
very low wage. See David Zimmerman, Coercive Wage Offers, 10 PHIL. & PUB. AFF.
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This account suggests why blackmail is often worse than
revealing embarrassing information. Revealing embarrassing
information, though it alters options, does not usually coerce. It
does not coerce because the purpose of revelation is not usually to
induce the person to do anything. Limiting another's options in
order to alter her behavior is prima facie wrong for reasons that do
not apply to altering her options for other purposes. 26 Everyone
benefits from and can abide by a rule against threats. But we
cannot avoid limiting one another's options when we act for other
purposes.
Revealing information does not usually exploit. Unlike most
blackmailers, many people who reveal embarrassing information do
so for nonexploitative purposes: to aid police in capturing
criminals, to inform the public of important news, or to collect a
reward. Revelation does not exploit unless profits increase based on
characteristics such as hardship.
Despite these advantages, theories of coercion and exploitation
do not solve the longstanding problems of blackmail. First, these
ideas alone cannot explain the immorality of blackmail. A patch-
work is needed to explain all that is wrong with blackmail, and what
is wrong with all blackmail. Second, these are controversial
theories. Perhaps a patchwork of explanations that rejects such
controversies is preferable. I address these two concerns in turn
and conclude that theories of coercion and exploitation are
necessary but not sufficient to explain blackmail.
A. Noncoercive Blackmail
Not all blackmail fits the paradigm of coercion I describe. If
unable to negotiate, some blackmailers would acquire information
in order to reveal it. Some would disclose information accidentally
acquired. Must I admit that these blackmailers do no wrong or that
we should decriminalize their behavior? I do not think so. Most of
these blackmailers either commit some other wrong, or cannot be
identified easily enough to create a practical exception to the
blackmail laws. If those who commit no wrong are rare and difficult
121, 133 (1981). Although blackmailers do not commit acts of violence, insofar as
they limit freedom in order to take advantage of the limits created, blackmailers
and Zimmerman's kidnapper share an important characteristic.
26 This distinction is common. Se4 e.g., Kent Greenawalt, Criminal Coercion and
Freedom of Speech, 78 Nw. U. L. REV. 1081, 1098 (1983) (defining manipulative
threats as those that are both "situation-altering" and "action-inducing").
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to detect, we rightly ban blackmail except for narrowly stated
exceptions.
Many blackmailers propose to reveal information that is immoral
or illegal to reveal, such as appropriately private information,
information acquired by invasions of privacy, or false informa-
tion.27 Others propose to keep secret information they ought to
disclose, such as information about commission of crimes. Still
others propose to decide about disclosure based on grounds that
they ought to ignore, such as the newspaper publisher who proposes
to publish information if not paid.28 Although this case is thought
to raise a puzzle, it seems to me a simple case of corruption.
29
Most newspaper publishers have assumed an obligation to make
publication decisions based on judgments about newsworthiness.
3 0
Taking payment to quash stories is thus morally corrupt.
Most blackmailers exploit, demanding much more for silence
than they could have received for disclosure. They are able to do
so because their victims seek to protect central aspects of their lives.
What about market-price-only blackmailers who demand for
silence only what they could and would have received for disclo-
sure?31 This practice is less wrong than most blackmail. If the
proposer does not exploit, or remove otherwise available important
options, the transaction is likely no worse than actual disclosure.
3 2
For example:
Susan, while trying out her new video camera, accidentally films
Allan-a Hasidic Jew dressed in traditional garb-eating lunch at
Porky's Porkchops. The local television station is holding a
contest offering $100 for embarrassing videos. Susan rightly
27 See Feinberg, supra note 3, at 93 (discussing fabricated blackmail); Lindgren,
supra note 1, at 689 n.102 (same).
28 See, e.g., Owens, supra note 17, at 501-03 (hypothesizing a scenario involving
a newspaper editor who unearths compromising information about a cabinet
minister).
' There is a puzzle about corruption cases. What accounts for our intuition
that the victim of blackmail is a victim? If the duty was owed to the public, or
another qualified applicant, one could understand punishing the blackmailer, but
why should the person asked to pay have any moral complaint? I suspect that the
answer lies in a combination of apprehensions that very often the victim is
deprived of something, concerns about exploitation, and simple prophylactic
intuitions.
30 Not all publishers purport to make decisions on such a basis, but most news
sources explicitly or implicitly assume such an obligation. The New York Times, for
example, proclaims each day: "All the news that's fit to print."
31 See Lindgren, supra note 1, at 693.
2 See Murphy, supra note 1, at 164-65.
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believes that her video can win. She demands $100 of Allan for
the only copy of the video.
In my view, Susan ought not disclose Allan's secret. I do not think
it worse, however, to sell Allan the video than to reveal it. She is
not exploiting because her price is not increased due to Allan's
difficult circumstances. She does not expose Allan to the likelihood
of future exploitation because she will give him the only copy of the
video. If unable to negotiate with Allan she would enter the
contest, so the proposal actually improves Allan's options.
Perhaps some blackmailers do nothing wrong. Susan might have
videotaped Bob, a famous athlete, tripping. If disclosure would
expose Bob to no harm beyond a few jokes, I see no moral
objection to disclosing the film or selling it to Bob for $100.
I nonetheless support a law prohibiting Susan's behavior in both
cases for prophylactic reasons. The situation is probably rare,
33
and difficult to distinguish from serious moral wrongs. Market-
price-only blackmail is hard to detect because there cannot be any
guarantee that a first payment will not be followed by more
demands. 34 Even if blackmail were lawful, the practical problems
of enforcing promises not to reveal embarrassing information would
be overwhelming.3 5 Noncoercive blackmail is impossible to detect
because there is no way to distinguish blackmailers who would have
disclosed the information without the chance to negotiate from
those who propose the transaction only in order to extract payment
for their silence.
We rightly risk deterring the beneficial and acceptable transac-
tion between Allan or Bob and Susan in order to protect many
people from exploitation, coercion, and breached obligations, and
33 One reason to think the situation with Bob is rare is that if someone will pay
very much for nondisclosure, the information is likely damaging. If so, there is
likely some obligation either not to disclose or to disclose it.
3' Even Susan might later demand further payment not to tell people what she
saw.
35 See Epstein, supra note 18, at 563. Blackmail contracts are unlike other
promises, even promises to keep trade secrets. First, a blackmail victim might not
want the enforcing court to know the embarrassing secret. Second, injunctions do
no good if the blackmailer divulges the information. In the case of a trade secret,
the informed party can be enjoined from using the information. With blackmail,
mere revelation is the harm. Third, contract remedies may be insufficient. Unlike
trade secrets, the breach of which money can compensate, a blackmail victim likely
prefers secrecy to reimbursement or other compensation. Because victims will
ignore sunk costs in deciding whether to reject succeeding demands, victims can
be induced over time to pay more for secrecy than it is worth to them.
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to deter evildoers from committing these acts. In those few cases
in which we can identify blackmailers who do not coerce and
exploit, or who do so with justification, the law tries to provide
practical defenses and exceptions.
3 6
For example, claim-of-right blackmail involves a threat to inform
the public of an individual's failure to satisfy a debt unless the debt
is paid. 7 Permitting such blackmail might be justified because, if
unable to demand satisfaction, the person often would inform the
public anyway. Additionally, because the price asked is only what
is owed, it is not exploitative. Finally, the enforcement of 4 good-
faith claim might justify some prima facie wrong.
Similarly, permitting payer-initiated bargains might reflect the
intuition that payers would not offer to pay for silence unless they
had reason to think the other party planned to reveal the informa-
tion.3 8 If so, permitting such bargains roughly reflects the accept-
ability of noncoercive blackmail. The correlation, however, is only
rough.3 9 Evidentiary and definitional problems with payer-initiation
can undermine any power it has to separate coercive from non-
coercive transactions. Some bargains appear payer-initiated because
the payer initially suggests the deal. But the payer might only learn
of the other party's intent to reveal the embarrassing information
after that party discloses this intent in order to elicit an offer of
payment. Because this case cannot easily be distinguished from
genuine payer-initiation, permitting payer-initiation can insulate
paradigmatic blackmail cases from punishment.
40
Of course, I am speculating about the frequency and identifiabil-
ity of different kinds of blackmail. These speculations might play
an important role in decisions to prohibit blackmail or define its
36 For a detailed discussion of what circumstances might justify or excuse
blackmail, see JOEL FEINBERG, HARMLESS WRONGDOING 262-69 (1988).
37 See Lindgren, supra note 1, at 677-79.
38 For an extended argument that theories of blackmail must explain why
victim-initiated transactions are lawful, see generally Sidney W. DeLong, Blackmail-
ers, Bribe Takers, and the Second Paradox of Blackmail, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1663, 1665-
85 (1993).
39 Payers will often be wrong in assuming that the other party would disclose if
unable to negotiate. The exclusion is thus overinclusive. It is also underinclusive
because some recipient-initiated transactions will involve individuals who would
disclose if unable to bargain. In addition, there is little to prevent exploitation in
payer-initiated bargains.
40 A parallel problem arises distinguishing the crime of bribe-taking from
extortion. Compare United States v. Aguon, 851 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir. 1988) (en
banc) (extortion requires an act inducing the payment) with Evans v. United States,
112 S. Ct. 1881 (1992) (extortion does not require any inducement).
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scope. 41 Like any limit on apparently consensual bargains, the
criminalization of blackmail makes some potential blackmail victims
worse off. They would prefer to pay the price of silence rather than
suffer disclosure. But if relatively few people would acquire silence
because of the market, then combatting the ills of coercion,
exploitation, breached obligation, and consequential harms of
blackmail42 exacts a low social cost. Like any market intervention,
'its wisdom depends in part on the number of consumers benefitted
compared to the number of consumers hurt as well as on the
magnitude of the effects.
43
Several observations made in this Symposium make me hesitate
about the broad prohibition of blackmail. First, perhaps many
blackmailers would disclose information if unable to negotiate, even
if blackmail were legal. If blackmail laws actually do remove many
opportunities, perhaps the ban on blackmail unwisely sacrifices the
welfare of many willing purchasers to protect few real victims from
coercion. Second, perhaps we could accurately distinguish coercive
and noncoercive blackmail. For example, we might permit a
defense to blackmail charges if the blackmailer had credible
evidence that a third party would have paid for the information.
Such evidence would suggest that the blackmailer would have
disclosed if unable to negotiate. Perhaps this mechanism could also
screen for exploitation. The defense might be limited to cases in
which the blackmailer demanded no more for silence than the third
party would have paid for the information. Additionally, we might
permit the defense only in cases that the blackmailer somehow
could not easily have demanded additional payments.
I can hardly insist that I am right about either the frequency of
wrongful blackmail or the practicality of such defenses. I claim only
that if my speculations are true, they justify prohibiting blackmail,
41 Michael Gorr notes that we cannot automatically assume that most black-
mailers would keep silent if unable to negotiate; we simply do not know. See
Michael Gorr, Liberalism and the Paradox of Blackmail, 21 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 43, 61
(1992). Although I agree that we do not know, our rules and moral intuitions
might be based on an educated guess.
42 See infra notes 57-63 and accompanying text.
43 See Richard Craswell, Passing on the Costs of Legal Rules: Efficiency and
Distribution in Buyer-Seller Relationships, 43 STAN. L. REV. 361 (1991). Michael Gorr
relies on a less consequentialist argument for a similar conclusion. In his view,
those potential blackmail victims made worse off by the ban on blackmail are less
entitled to concern than those benefitted because the former often are wrongfully
keeping information secret. He has criminals primarily in mind. See Gorr, supra
note 41, at 62-63.
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and that in the absence of better evidence we can do no more than
hypothesize as best we can.
B. A Less Controversial Patchwork
I have so far suggested that blackmail is wrong for a variety of
moral reasons, including that it is often coercive and exploitative.
My accounts of coercion and exploitation are admittedly controver-
sial. Even those who accept them as moral accounts might reject
them as justifications for criminal penalties because they do not
involve rights violations or because they justify prophylactic
rules. 44 Might a patchwork of explanations that does not rely on
prophylactic arguments and on controversial notions of coercion
and exploitation succeed? In this section, I consider a number of
prominent theories, all of which explain important aspects of
blackmail's immorality. I conclude that they fail as a group to
explain some aspects of blackmail unless supplemented with
accounts of coercion and exploitation, or extended in ways that
make them at least as controversial as the explanation provided
here.
These arguments are nonetheless valuable parts of a patchwork
theory of blackmail. The sheer number of overlapping moral
objections to blackmail explains both why people regard it as so
immoral, and why those with such different moral commitments
agree about its immorality. Furthermore, the variety of moral
objections supports a patchwork justification for prohibition:
although no single moral objection applies to all blackmail, almost
no blackmail avoids moral condemnation on all grounds. Blackmail
that does avoid all moral objections usually cannot be identified
easily enough to support exceptions to blackmail laws.
44 Eric Mack considers the argument that blackmail is usually immoral and that
we cannot easily isolate moral blackmail. Mack considers this a reason to permit
blackmail. He apparently believes that only immoral acts that violate rights can be
crimes. See Eric Mack, In Defense of Blackmail, 41 PHIL. STUD. 273, 283 (1982); see
also Walter Block, Trading Money for Silence, 8 U. HAW. L. REv. 57, 73 (1986)
(arguing that blackmail, while not ethical, is not an "invasive act, nor threat
thereof, not an initiation of violence, nor a violation of rights" and therefore
should not be criminalized); Michael Gorr, Nozick's Argument Against Blackmail, 58
PERSONALIST 187, 190 (1977) (arguing that laws against blackmail cannot be
upheld based upon the theory that blackmail is an "unproductive" economic
transaction).
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1. Rights and Duties
One could try, like Joel Feinberg or Michael Gorr, to base the
immorality of blackmail exclusively on the insight that many
blackmailers propose to reveal information that they morally ought
to disclose, morally ought to keep secret, or morally ought to decide
whether to disclose based on grounds other than price.
45
Relying on this argument as a complete answer poses problems.
First, on many plausible views of moral obligation, revelation is
sometimes permissible and nonmandatory. For example, many
people believe that disclosing marital infidelity to a cheated spouse
is sometimes permissible but not required. Yet demanding payment
not to do so is a paradigm case of wrongful blackmail.4 6 In order
to address this difficulty, moral-obligation solutions require a
controversial commitment to the pervasiveness of obligations.
Second, even if all blackmailers had uncontroversial obligations
to disclose, to keep silent, or to decide on other grounds, these
obligations do not explain the entire wrong. Obligations to disclose
are often owed to someone besides the blackmail victim. Yet most
people believe that blackmail wrongs its victims, not just third
parties. Further, blackmail is often far worse than inappropriate
disclosure or nondisclosure. This suggests that some of the wrong
stems from sources other than the breached obligation. 47 Finally,
4 5 See Feinberg, supra note 3, at 83-84; Gorr, supra note 41, at 46. One who
adopts this position must believe either that no human behavior is morally
optional or that no disclosure decision with consequences severe enough to make
blackmail possible is morally optional.
46 Feinberg admits that the adultery case is a problem, and concludes that
blackmail of this sort should be lawful. See FEINBERG, supra note 36, at 249. Gorr
argues that there is always either a duty to disclose marital infidelity or an
obligation to keep it secret, though which cases are which is not always clear. See
Gorr, supra note 41, at 62-63.
47 Leo Katz provides an ingenious response to this difficulty. He claims that
we should judge the morality of blackmail not by the importance of the obligation
blackmailers threaten to breach, but by the severity of the action they take,
receiving property. See Leo Katz, Blackmail and Other Forms of Arm-Twisting, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 1567, 1598 (1993).
I do not find this argument completely convincing. If Professor Katz were
right, we should regard it as a serious moral wrong, perhaps appropriately
criminalized, for a factory owner to demand payment for reducing pollution levels
below legally mandated limits. Surely polluting (even lawfully) is often as immoral
as disclosing secrets. Yet demanding payment for silence seems a greater moral
wrong than demanding payment for cleaner air. In my view, this is so because the
latter is likely not coercive. If unable to demand payment, the polluter would
continue polluting.
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disclosure is often legally optional. This suggests that some moral
obligations are too small or of the wrong sort to justify legal
enforcement. If so, why should we attach legal consequences to
conditional breach of these obligations?4"
One might respond to these difficulties by adding Hugh Evans's
suggestion that there is always some obligation, albeit defeasible,
not to say embarrassing things. We do not prohibit embarrassing
disclosures because concerns about free expression justify permit-
ting the harm. Because blackmail proposals result in silence if
accepted, free expression concerns weigh less heavily and do not
justify permitting the harm.
49
Evans's theory explains how all acts of blackmail breach obliga-
tions, why the blackmail victim is the beneficiary of these obliga-
tions, and why we punish blackmail but not disclosure. His account,
however, does not explain why blackmail is often morally far worse
than actual disclosure. Protecting free speech need not temper
moral condemnation. Yet breaching obligations of secrecy by
disclosing rarely seems as bad as breaching them through blackmail.
This suggests that the wrong of blackmail does not stem solely from
breaching obligations to keep silent. Further, the wrong Evans
identifies does not seem serious enough to justify criminal penalties.
Even when disclosure is considered bad enough to transgress legal
limitations, such as slander or disclosure of private facts, it carries
only civil penalties.
2. Third-Party Interests
One could supplement moral-obligation arguments with Jim
Lindgren's suggestion that blackmailers inappropriately use the
interests of third parties to gain leverage in a transaction. In those
cases in which the information will be kept from someone involved
in a dispute with the victim, the blackmailer, bargaining with
someone else's chips, has settled the dispute and kept some of the
proceeds for himself.
50
" Larry Solum has suggested to me that this last problem might be solved by
recognizing how hard it is in any given case to know whether one is obligated to
disclose or not to disclose. For example, deciding whether to reveal a marital
infidelity committed by one friend against another might be a difficult moral
decision. Because reaching the right outcome will be subject to error, we should
not criminalize a bad decision. But one can easily know that one should not
decide on the basis of the unfaithful spouses' willingness to pay.
4' See Evans, supra note 17, at 93.
50 See Lindgren, supra note 1, at 702 (noting that the leverage exerted by a
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This suggestion also has its limits. First, persons deprived of
information often have no claim that is compromised by this lost
information. Yet in such cases blackmailers commit serious wrongs
by demanding payment for their silence. For example, if I tell you
that I will inform your neighbors that your father was a war criminal
unless you pay me a large sum, I have committed a serious wrong
even though I have not used anyone else's rights or settled anyone
else's dispute inappropriately. Second, what is immoral about using
the rights of third parties and why is it not similarly wrong simply
to remain silent? In both cases, failing to provide the information
effectively settles the dispute. Third, it leaves unexplained the
intuition that blackmailers wrong the threatened party.
5 1
3. Promoting Virtues
Several writers have suggested that blackmail laws promote
various virtues. These theories assume controversial moral views,
especially when used to justify criminal sanctions. Further, they do
not alone seem sufficient to justify the severity or expansiveness of
blackmail laws. 52 Nonetheless as part of a patchwork, each adds
a good reason for condemning some blackmailers.
Jeremy Waldron suggests that blackmailers who demand
payment to keep silent about evil acts are complicit with evil. 3
Complicity arguments, however, are very controversial. Few people
are willing to punish complicity that does not encourage or aid evil-
doers.54 Fewer still would punish complicity with evil acts that are
blackmailer "belongs more to a third person than to the blackmailer").
51 During his presentation at the Blackmail Symposium, Professor Lindgren
pointed out that he never intended his chip theory as a sufficient reason for
criminalization, only a necessary one. He favors banning blackmail when it both
coerces and wrongfully uses the chip of a third party. His chip analysis, he says,
comprehends a form of exploitation. As part of such a patchwork, I find his
arguments more compelling.
52 Wendy Gordon suggests that blackmail laws serve to promote the virtue of
pride. See Wendy J. Gordon, Truth and Consequences: The Force of Blackmail's
Central Case, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1741, 1780-82 (1993). She does not fall into the
trap of thinking this purpose alone justifies prohibiting blackmail. Rather, she
offers this as a benefit of prohibition which she justifies based on a theory of
coercion.
53 See Jeremy Waldron, Blackmail as Complicity 4 (Nov. 1992) (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
54 Waldron notes laws against profiting from crimes such as the Son of Sam
law. See Waldron, supra note 53, at 17-18; cf. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. New York
State Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct. 501 (1991) (declaring unconstitutional New
York's "Son of Sam" statute, which required that an accused or convicted crimi-
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themselves not subject to punishment. Complicity also does not
explain the immorality of blackmailing those who fear revelation for
reasons other than condemnation. For example, if I discover that
a neighbor is a movie star living in secret to avoid the throngs of
adoring fans who make her life difficult, it would be immoral and
appropriately criminal to demand payment to forego telling the
tabloids. Yet I have not evidenced any inappropriate attitude
toward evil.
Complicity theories also do not explain why we regard blackmail
victims as victims. Waldron acknowledges this and suggests we
should not feel sorry for blackmail victims. Some supposed victims
are vicious people who deserve to be exposed and punished. 55 I
do not think this a reason to abandon the intuition that blackmailers
wrong their victims. First, not all blackmail victims are vicious
people deserving punishment. Second, people who deserve
punishment are wronged if harmed by someone not entitled to
carry out that punishment. The fact that wrongdoers do not
deserve pity does not prevent condemning those who act badly
toward them. For example, it is both illegal and prima facie
immoral to steal from a thief. That we feel little sympathy for the
victim does not prevent understanding theft as a wrong to the
victim.
4. Domination
George Fletcher suggests that blackmail is immoral and
appropriately prohibited because blackmail creates relationships of
domination. Because the blackmailer can almost always repeat
demands, the relationship is potentially infinite.5 6  Although I
agree that creating such a relationship is immoral and appropriately
criminalized, I do not think this a complete justification for
condemning and prohibiting blackmail. First, the criminal nature
of making repeated demands does not explain why the first demand
should be criminal. If the explanation is that the latter is needed
because one cannot detect the former, then the crime might be too
prophylactic to satisfy some people. Second, even if we rightly
favors imprisoning publishers who sell books about crimes.
55 See Waldron, supra note 53, at 8-9.
M See George P. Fletcher, BlackmaiL The Paradigmatic Crime, 141 U. PA. L. REV.
1617, 1626 (1993). Sidney DeLong's view that blackmail undermines community by
isolating its victims relies in part on this same argument. See DeLong, supra note 38,
at 1690-92.
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prohibit the first demand to deter the second, this account does not
explain moral condemnation of the first demand. Perhaps we
condemn the first demand because it creates the danger of a future
relationship of domination. But this explanation seems insufficient
to account for the severity of condemnation. Finally, we condemn
and prohibit blackmail even when future demands are unlikely or
impossible.
5. Waste and Subsidiary Harms
One might explain the wrong of blackmail based on its bad
consequences. Blackmail might encourage wasteful investigations
and invasions of privacy;5 7 increase transaction costs and inefficien-
cy;58 conceal fraud and other important information; 59 cause
overenforcement or underenforcement of criminal laws; 60 and
encourage its victims to turn to crime to pay blackmailers.
6 1
These insights alone do not resolve most people's concerns
about blackmail. They do not account for the strong intuition that
blackmail is a wrong to the victim. And for all but the most
committed consequentialist, they fail to explain why blackmail is a
very serious offense deserving criminal punishment.62 Nonetheless,
in conjunction with the prophylactic arguments discussed above,
they urge the selection of blackmail from among wrongful transac-
tions as worth deterring.
63
57 SeeJoseph Isenbergh, Blackmail from A to C, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1905, 1911-15
(1993); Murphy, supra note 1, at 158-59.
58 See e.g., Ronald H. Coase, The 1987 McCorkle Lecture: Blackmail, 74 VA. L. REV.
655, 673 (1988); Douglas H. Ginsburg & Paul Shechtman, Blackmail: An Economic
Analysis of the Law, 141 U. PA. L. REV. 1849, 1859-65 (1993); Steven Shavell, Economic
Analysis of Threats and Their Illegality: Blackmai4 Extortion, and Robbery, 141 U. PA. L.
REV. 1877, 1899-1900 (1993).
59 See Epstein, supra note 18, at 564; Isenbergh, supra note 57, at 1925-27.
60 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Private Enforcement of Law, 4
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 42 (1975); Richard A. Posner, Blackmai Privacy, and Freedom of
Contract, 141 U. PA. L. REv. 1817, 1821-23 (1993). But see Brown, supra note 1, at
1956-58 (arguing that concerns about overenforcement and underenforcement are
based on faulty assumptions).
61 See Epstein, supra note 18, at 564.
62 Divergence between those interested in blackmail's efficiency and those
interested in its condemnation and criminalization can be seen in Ginsburg's analogy
between the criminalization of blackmail and laws creating tort actions for spite
fences. See Ginsburg, supra note 58, at 1860-65. Both promote efficiency, but their
mechanism for doing so differs. Threatening to construct a spite fence or even
erecting one is no crime. If the disclosure of embarrassing secrets really resembled
the construction of spite fences, then we would permit blackmail and create a tort
action for spiteful disclosures of embarrassing facts.
65 ome writers who stress blackmail's bad consequences pair their harm-to-society
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In combination, all the theories mentioned in this section
account for many puzzles and provide ample reason to prohibit
blackmail. I nonetheless find them unsatisfying for the reasons
outlined above. Particularly, they do not explain very well the
intuition that blackmail is often more wrong than disclosure or
nondisclosure and that blackmailers wrong their victims. I believe
that we can best understand the nature of blackmail's immorality by
combining the accounts discussed in this section with theories of
exploitation and coercion.
Patching together several accounts promises to explain and
justify the condemnation and prohibition of blackmail. We should
not reject partial accounts merely because they fail to explain one
case or another. They might be valuable elements in a theory when
paired with moral accounts that apply to other examples and with
practical explanations thatjustify overinclusion and underinclusion.
Explanations of consequential harms, even if they do not justify
criminalization, often provide persuasive arguments for criminal-
izing acts that are immoral for other reasons.
III. OTHER MARKET TRANSACTIONS
Does my explanation of blackmail commit me to criminalizing
other transactions? It is often lawful to negotiate with vulnerable
people, and to sell things we might otherwise give away for free. If
acts I define as exploitative or coercive should remain lawful, my
arguments prove too much. 64
claims with exploitation arguments. Jeffrie Murphy argues that blackmail creates
incentives to invade privacy and that blackmailers exploit their victims. See Murphy,
supra note 1, at 163-64. In this way, he explains why blackmail is a serious wrong to
the victim and also provides a reason for selecting blackmail for criminal prohibition
from among many potentially exploitative transactions. Lindgren criticizes Murphy's
account because it cannot explain the prohibition of opportunistic blackmail. If the
information is accidentally acquired, permitting the blackmail does not encourage
snooping. See Lindgren, supra note 1, at 689-91. This conclusion is a hasty one. We
prohibit opportunistic blackmail because there is no practical way for criminal law to
distinguish entrepreneurial blackmail from opportunistic blackmail. If the law is to
deter the snooping associated with the former, it must prohibit the latter as well.
" See e.g., Murphy, supra note 1, at 157 (noting that we do not criminalize many
obviously exploitative proposals, and do permit many proposals accepted by people
in circumstances more desperate than many blackmail victims).
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The arguments discussed in the prior section provide reasons to
think blackmail a particularly harmful and immoral transaction,
even among those that coerce and exploit. In addition, I will make
two responses. First, not all hard bargaining coerces or exploits.
Second, practical considerations justify permitting some coercion
and exploitation. I illustrate each point in turn.
Not all hard bargaining coerces or exploits. These wrongs occur
only when some item of importance is the subject of negotiation,
and when there is some source of power available to one party,
often monopoly. If the item is relatively unimportant or there are
other providers, there will be little ability to exploit or coerce.
People with power to exploit or coerce do not always do so.
Consider rescue bargains. That rescuers demand high payments for
their services does not prove that they coerce or exploit. Many
rescuers would not be present or would not rescue if unable to
,charge a fee. Unlike many blackmailers, these rescuers provide a
service they would not otherwise provide. Although people in need
of rescue face difficult circumstances, rescuers do not necessarily
exploit these circumstances. Unless the rescuer charges a higher
price for a rescue of equal difficulty when the rescuer finds that the
victim faces imminent suffering or death, the rescuer has not taken
advantage of the victim's hardship.
Of course, some rescue negotiations, like most blackmail
negotiations, involve coercion and exploitation. Some rescuers
would rescue for free if unable to bargain, and some exploit the
desperate circumstances of the victim to extract promises of large
payment. One might think that the principles justifying blackmail
laws would also justify criminalizing some demands for payment by
rescuers.
There are practical reasons, however, not to criminalize such
demands. 65 The rescuers who would not be present or would not
perform the rescue if unable to demand payment might be difficult
to differentiate from those who would rescue without payment.
Unless law can sort these individuals appropriately and predictably,
any criminal penalty would deter rescues. Because encouraging
rescue is important, we should not risk potential deterrence by
punishing those rescuers who coerce and exploit. Furthermore,
65 1 can think of two exceptions. Proposals to rescue for a price should be crimes
when made either by public safety officials (the Coast Guard) or people who
intentionally created the need of rescue in order to profit. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 314-325 (1965).
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agreements in rescue negotiations could be policed through a
carefully crafted set of contractual-release doctrines.
Blackmail differs from rescue in practical terms. First, civil
remedies are a less practical solution to coercion and exploitation
in blackmail cases. Blackmail cannot be addressed by contract law
because of the problems of monitoring promises to keep embarrass-
ing secrets. Second, if unable to bargain, the proportion of rescuers
who would rescue for free is likely to be much lower than the
proportion of blackmailers who would keep the secret. Third,
intentionally acquiring embarrassing information to be used for
blackmail is wasteful.66 Insofar as the ban on blackmail deters
people from searching for and then hiding embarrassing informa-
tion, it does no harm and likely does some good.67
I do not want to overstate the difference. Criminalizing
blackmail deters some individuals from purchasing silence at a price
that they would be happy to pay and in contravention of no moral
or legal obligation. Permitting rescuers to demand payment
sometimes leads needy people to pay for rescues they might have
had for free, and to pay prices inflated by their desperation. We
treat the two practices differently not because there is no overlap,
but because: (1) we cannot easily distinguish particular threats from
particular offers; (2) we suspect that coercion and exploitation are
far more common among blackmailers than among rescuers; and (3)
the risk of deterring rescue is more dangerous than permitting
immoral rescue bargains, while the risks of permitting coercion and
exploitation in the sale of secrecy seem more serious than the harms
of deterring bargains for silence. The distinctions are not those of
principle. They result from the practical balancing typical in legal
decisionmaking.
68
66 See Ginsburg, supra note 58, at 1859-65. Arguments noting that blackmail is
wasteful have often been met with the claim that we do not and should criminalize
wasteful bargains. Wastefulness is not a reason for banning blackmail. Rather, it is
a reason for not being concerned about the effects of the ban.
67 The claim that bans on blackmail effectuate good consequences stems from
several sources. First, insofar as decriminalization would encourage research
blackmail, it creates an incentive for invasions ofprivacy. Second, insofar as contracts
are difficult to enforce, decriminalization creates the potential for repeated demands
for payment, and therefore may encourage criminal acts by the victim in much the
way drug dependency encourages other crimes. Third, insofar as blackmail
sometimes permits people to keep secrets that otherwise would have been disclosed,
some important information is hidden as a result.
s8 Murphy asserts:
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These practical decisions can be difficult. Some transactions
that regularly coerce and exploit concern items of such value that
we hesitate to ban negotiations about them. Although permitting
these transactions increases the coercion and exploitation of many
individuals, prohibiting them would have worse consequences in
those bargains that would not have been coercive.
For example, it is not usually criminal to demand payment for
revealing beneficial information. Imagine that everyone wrongly
believes Rich is a member of the Ku Klux Klan. Bob discovers
evidence showing that the rumor is false. Bob tells Rich that he will
share the evidence in exchange for one million dollars. This
proposal is likely to be coercive and exploitative. In this regard it
resembles blackmail. But prohibiting the proposal could be
problematic. Some exculpatory information is discovered intention-
ally and through some effort. I would hesitate to enact criminal
laws that could deter discovery and disclosure of exculpatory
information. In this regard, Bob's proposal is more like a rescue
proposal than a typical blackmail proposal.
CONCLUSION
Although no single argumentjustifies condemning and prohibit-
ing all and only blackmail transactions, overlapping arguments can
accomplish this task. The most promising approach is to pair
various moral objections that apply to different forms of blackmail
with practical difficulties in creating exceptions for the few cases not
covered. Arguments about the wastefulness of blackmail serve both
as reasons not to be very concerned about overinclusive laws and as
reasons for permitting transactions that seem like blackmail but are
more productive.
There are several patchwork theories that might justify prohibit-
ing blackmail, but not disclosure or hard bargains. Some of these
have trouble explaining strongly held intuitions about blackmail,
We could grant that blackmail and hard economic transactions of [a
certain kind] are both intrinsically immoral ... and still consistently
advocate criminalization for the former but not for the latter .... We
might, for example, argue that criminalizing blackmail would only
deprive people of incentives it would be desirable for them not to have
... whereas criminalizing economic transactions of [this other] kind
might deprive people of socially useful incentives.
Murphy, supra note 1, at 163.
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such as that it is a serious moral wrong to a victim, and that it is
usually more wrong than disclosing the embarrassing information.
The seriousness of blackmail as a wrong to a victim is most
easily explained if the patchwork of theories includes accounts of
blackmail as coercive and exploitative. Blackmail is coercive when
the blackmailer would have kept silent had the opportunity to
demand payment been unavailable. Blackmail is exploitative when
the blackmailer obtains a premium over other uses for her informa-
tion because of the victim's hardship.
Blackmailers who neither coerce nor exploit usually breach
obligations to disclose, to keep silent, or to decide on grounds other
than price. Although the few blackmailers who do not coerce or
exploit act in a less morally wrongful manner than those who do,
creating an exception to the blackmail laws for them would be
impractical. We permit other potentially coercive and exploitative
transactions, such as rescue bargains, because we think coercion and
exploitation are less common in these cases, and because encourag-
ing productive exchanges is sometimes more pressing than deterring
coercion and exploitation.
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